Estimating Flight Software Risk for a Space Launch Vehicle by Hatfield, S. et al.
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
www.nasa.gov
Estimating Flight 
Software Risk for a 
Space Launch Vehicle
International  Association  for the 
Advancement of Space Safety 
October 21, 2014
S. Novack1, S.Hatfield1, M. Al Hassan1,J.Bales2, 
P. Britton2, F.Hark1, J.Stott2
1Bastion Technologies, Inc.
2NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140016880 2019-08-31T16:25:16+00:00Z
Why is Understanding Software Risk
Important to NASA?
“Software had a critical role in a large share (~ 60% in quantitative 
terms) of the failures suffered by NASA in high-stakes missions 
during the 1998 – 2007 decade.” (NASA PRA Procedures Guide, 2010)
 1962 - Mariner 1 (incorrect formula coded)
 1988 - Phobos (deactivated thrusters)
 1996 - Ariane 5 (reused Ariane 4 software)
 1999 - Mars Polar Lander (mistook turbulence for landing)
 1999 - Mars Climate Orbiter (unit conversion)
 2004 - Spirit (flash memory full)
 2005 - CryoSat-1 (missing shutdown command)
 2006 - Mars Global Surveyor (assumption of motor failure)
 2011 - Express-AM4 (faulty parameter)
Software versus Hardware Characteristics
 Failure cause
 Wear-out
 Repairable system concept
 Environmental factors
 Reliability prediction
 Redundancy
 Interfaces
 Failure rate motivators
 Standard components
The NASA definition of software failure is “Flight Computer Software 
(FSW) performs the wrong action, fails to perform the intended action, or 
performs the intended action at the wrong time.” NASA Shuttle 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), SSA-08-11 rev B
Potential Methods
Used to Obtain Software Risk
 Mathematical model using Space Launch Vehicle software data 
from flights 
 Best possible data (assuming large data sets)
 Unavailable for first flight
 Mathematical model using historical data on a “like” system
 Low/moderate uncertainty
 May require modifications to fit Space Launch Vehicle
 Will provide a path to incorporate Space Launch Vehicle specific 
software data (test and flight)
 Heuristic method using generic statistical data
 Moderate uncertainty
 Different approaches, different results
 Context-based Software Risk Model (CSRM)
 Off-nominal scenarios
 Can be based on specific failure modes
 SOFTREL
 Ann Marie Neufelder
 Expert judgment
 Highest uncertainty
Software Reliability Metrics
 Product
 Code complexity, which is directly related to reliability
 Project Management  
 Organizational and management influence on the code 
outcome and reliability
 Process 
 Function of upgrades and software improvements to reach 
some steady state 
 Fault and Failure 
 Reliability trending estimated from software fault and failure 
data
Software Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) Characteristics
 Vetted approach
 Quantitative and Complete
 Tractable 
Easily understood and traceable
Assumptions
 Sensitive to environmental (context) failures
 Uses available test results and operational experience
 Quantifies uncertainty
 Can account for Common Cause Failures
“PRA is a systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate 
risks associated with every life-cycle aspect of a complex engineered 
technological entity (e.g., facility, spacecraft, or power plant) from 
concept definition, through design, construction and operation, and up 
to removal from service.”- NASA Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance
Considerations for Applying a Historical 
Data Approach
 Software Process
 Coding practices
 Testing schemes
 Programming Language and Operating system 
 Comparable language or equivalent basis
 Flight time 
 Mission versus Ascent or Reentry
 Software errors during different phases of flight
 Accounting 
 Source Lines of code (SLOC)
 Computer system structure
 Redundancy
 Independence or backup systems
Different Categories of Software Failures
 Coding errors
 Errors introduced into the code by human design or error 
 Are not detected during testing prior to first flight
 Have the potential to manifest during nominal mission conditions
 Context Latent Errors (LEs)
 Errors manifest during off-nominal conditions
 May need very specific conditions to manifest
 Would typically not be caught during testing
 “A segment of code that fulfills its requirements except under certain off-
nominal and probably unanticipated conditions.”
 Operating system errors
 Includes response to application errors
 Memory allocation problems
 Background processes
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Approach for Coding and Latent Errors
 Identify selected scenarios for off-nominal conditions
 Ex: Spacecraft navigation errors
 Determine how software contributes to selected scenarios (i.e., 
the software failure mode)
 Software causes a hardover
 Determine what portion of the code could cause the software 
error (e.g., modules, partitions, functions)

 Calculate Total Source Line of Codes (SLOCs) for each failure 
mode 
 Adjust reliability if needed to match historical data
 Estimate risk for each software failure mode based on Total SLOC 
per software failure mode
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Example of Historical Reliability Data
 Uncertainty increases with higher 
levels of testing
 Quantify historic system differences 
(redundancy)
 Operational errors making it 
through testing onto flight
 Establishes a reliability constant  
for SLOC that can be corrected for 
new system
Example of Software Failure Modes by 
Code Segments
Software Failure Mode Associated Software
Conversion/corruption data 
on navigation
Data 
Conversion 
Engine 
Code
Last Good Data on BUS 
(Stale Data)
Input Data 
Exchange
OutPut Data 
Exchange
Application 
Code
Data 
Conversion Data In Infrastructure
Command 
Code
Loss of Computer 
Communication
Communicat
ion Code
System 
Code
Booster hardover (left) Booster Code
Booster hardover (right) Booster Code
Navigation Whole Vehicle 
Hardover
Navigation 
Code
Booster 
Code
No Booster Sep Command Application Code 
System 
Code 
Command Early or Late System Code
Inadvertent Command Data Conversion
Application 
Code
No Command Application Code
A Nominal Software Risk Example and 
Ranges
 Reliability growth curves 
can provide ranges
 Uncertainty may be 
affected by extrapolation 
of historical data
Special Considerations
 Treatment of Software Common Cause Failures (CCFs)
Software CCF basic events can parallel hardware events (NUREG CR-6268)
 Uncertainty
 Historical or statistical based failure rates can have associated 
distributions
 Variability can be propagated via the distributions in the PRA model 
and standard uncertainty analysis methods 
 Software basic events can be correlated for Monte Carlo routines
 Software support
 Provide prioritized for software testing due to risk-informed data
 Model estimates can be provided for software reliability requirements 
per system
 Focus on software testing schemes
 Firmware
 Many of the major systems contain independently developed firmware 
or software (e.g., Navigation system, engine)
 Similar approach coupled with hardware reliability data can be used to 
estimate firmware reliability
Summary and Conclusions
 Software reliability is very difficult to predict and standard 
hardware reliability methods may be inappropriate
 Software groupings (e.g., modules, functions) can be used with a 
base unit of complexity (SLOC) to determine reliability 
 This approach allows testing information to be rolled into a 
module failure scheme at the functional level
 May be directly linked to physical partitions and processes
 Can be broken down into a component level to support software 
development needs
 Provides a meaningful resolution in the PRA (how and why a 
system fails)
 May have a direct correlation with vehicle specifications and 
requirements
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